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1. Introduction 
Choosing types of taxes becomes inevitable in either increasing tax revenue to meet an 
increase in government spending or decreasing tax revenue, for example, in pursuit of a 
smaller government. As Japanese confront, at both the central government and local 
governments, conflicting objectives of downsizing the governments on the one hand and of 
servicing mushrooming public debts that loom ahead, no doubt, a choice of taxes will 
become a subject of a heated public debate. 
The motivation underlying this paper stems from two sources. One source lies in the 
American experience of tax revolt in the recent past and of the ongoing pursuit of a smaller 
government coupled with the bold deregulation. The other lies in its possible implications 
for the Japanese municipalities whose drastic transformation seems imminent; they will be 
forced to service their massive debts looming over them and to assert their administrative, 
financial and political autonomy in the emerging tide of decentralization of the Japanese 
bureaucratic and political system. 
The U.S. taxation experience is rich and varied at both the federal and state levels. At 
the federal level, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 enacted during the Reagan administration is 
considered to have made the most radical revision in the U.S. tax code since the 1954 Tax 
Reform Act. It reduced the number of taxable income brackets and their corresponding tax 
rates from fourteen to only two brackets and two tax rates and at the same time slashed the 
top tax rate from 50% to 28%.1) The flat individual income tax rate was advocated in the 
1) The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, which was designed to reduce the federal deficit by almost 
$500 billion over the following five years, increased the tax brackets to three (15%, 28%, 31 %). In 
1993 the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act added the 36% and 39.6% tax brackets. The Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 provided the biggest tax cut since 1981. It is difficult to imagine today that the 
highest federal individual income tax rate charged was 94% in 1944. See, for further details the 
history of Federal taxation as well as for the variations and features of state taxation, Income Tax & 
Financial Planing: Quickfinder Handbook (Form 1040, 2001 Edition -2000 Tax Year) by TMI Tax 
Services, Inc., Minnesota, MN. 
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last few presidential elections.2) At the state level, each state has pursued its own design 
of tax revenue sources; for example, Washington, Texas and Florida have no individual 
income tax while Oregon has no sales tax. Several states in the name of tax revolt were 
successful in reducing property tax rates. These attempts to design or redesign the taxes in 
the States are far from complete, as the momentum of the social change for a smaller 
government remains intact. 
By contrast, the Japanese municipalities have long been dominated in both taxation and 
spending by the dictates and directives of the central government. The domination goes to 
the extent that different ministries at the central government send in their officials to local 
governments (both prefectural offices and city offices) to assume key administrative 
positions. This strong centralization has been further reinforced in the form of pork 
barreling through the close affiliation and coalition between the unshaken dominant 
political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the top echelon of the central government 
bureaucracy. The maladies, common to all local governments, of this long history of the 
Japanese centralization have been emerging as expected: growing discrepancy between 
local people's preferences and public expenditure projects (unwanted land developments, 
unwanted dam constructions to cite only a few samples), underdevelopment and paucity of 
administrative capabilities and expertise in the local governments, and mushrooming local 
government deficits. Hence, the local governments will be forced to battle at three front 
lines: scaling down their size, servicing their enormous debts and developing their 
autonomy divorced from the central government. The American experience in choosing 
taxes at both the state and federal levels may provide valuable lessons to the Japanese local 
governments. 
The purpose of the paper is to deduce the hypothesis in the form of two propositions that 
a choice of taxes by local governments depends on how income and tax-burden are 
distributed among the local residents. 
To make our argument tractable, we will confine our investigation to any of the 
following three situations: 
(i) a choice, via referendum, between the existing income tax and the existing sales tax 
in order to raise or reduce a certain sum of tax revenue, 
(ii) a choice between the two existing taxes to keep intact an existing tax revenue but to 
change the composition of the existing tax revenue sources, or 
(iii) a choice between resorting to an existing tax, say the personal income tax, and 
introducing a new tax, say a sales tax in order to raise, reduce or keep intact a certain 
sum of tax revenue. 
2) See for an early introduction of the flat rate tax Milton Friedman, An Economist's Protest: Columns in 
Political Economy (New Jersey: Thomas Horton and Company, 1972), 68-90. 
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Placing our paper in the perspective of a brief literature review, the issue presented in this 
. paper is identical to that in Varian (1996: 86-89): a choice between an individual income 
tax and a sales tax in order to finance a given public project. However, the two analytical 
frameworks are entirely distinct from each other. An individual choice is the subject in 
Varian's work which uses the framework of utility maximIzation by a representative 
consumer, ignoring the forces of the distribution of income and that of tax burden among 
the electorate of a given community. By contrast, a public choice is the subject of our 
paper, compelling us to explicitly bring those forces tucked away by Varian and their 
interplay into the center stage. 
However, our paper does not engage in a more involved issue of investigating the forces 
that determine tax structure. There seem to be four approaches that have emerged to study 
tax structure. One approach takes the framework of economic optimization, minimization 
of the deadweight loss (referred to as "excess burden" in the literature) to be exact, devoid 
of a public choice perspective (Sandmo 1976 and Yitzhaki 1979, for example) while a 
second approach focuses on how the parameters of particular tax functions are chosen 
through majority rule (Romer 1975, for example). A third approach, a public choice 
approach, taken for example by Holcombe (1998) emphasizes the need for a design of tax 
structure that minimizes the political costs of the tax system; these political costs result 
from the lack of a fiscal constitution as well as from a redistributive role of taxation, and 
these political costs are directly translated into the welfare cost of taxation. A fourth 
approach taken by Hettich and Winer (1988 and 1998) is to elucidate the interplay between 
the forces of economic optimization by individuals and the forces of maximization of 
political support in order to give a more comprehensive account of the existing tax 
structure such as tax bases, rate structures, and special provisions (e.g., exemptions and 
deductions ). 
2. The Analytical Framework 
The timeframe to be associated with the variables identified below is considered to be 
one year. The assumptions invoked are as follows: 
(i) There is a continuum of voters whose income is distributed between 0 and x. The 
distribution of income among the electorate is defined by 
f(x) = 
2 
-x 
x 
2( M) 2 
- 1+ - x 
x x-M x(x-M) 
for 0 S; x S; M 
(1) 
where f(x) denotes the percentage of voters (percentage because of the normalization) all 
having income x, and M is the mode of the distribution, satisfying M< x/2 in order to 
portray the distribution of income more commonly found in almost all countries. 
(ii) The burden of income tax at each different level of income is stipulated in the 
following income tax schedule: 
{o for ° < x < b / a Y - ax - b for b / a < x < X (2) 
where y and x denote the individual's income-tax payment and the individual's 
income, respectively, a and b are both positive constants (though initially we will 
analyze the case in which the individual income tax schedule is strictly proportional, 
i.e., b=O.) 
(iii) The burden of a sales tax at each different level of income is stipulated in the 
following sales tax schedule: 
y = ax + ~ for 0 < x < X (3) 
where y and x denote the individual's sales-tax payment and the individual's income 
respectively, a and ~ are both positive constants.3) 
(iv) a> a > O. This assumption reflects that lower income individuals' sales tax levels are 
relatively higher than their income tax levels, and the opposite is true of higher 
income individuals. 
(v) The amount of an increase (or a reduction) in the tax revenue via the individual 
income tax is set equal to the amount of an increase (or a reduction) via the sales tax. 
3) These linear tax schedules and distribution of the taxpayers over income are used to facilitate our 
computations without losing the analytic essence of the issue stemming from these schedules and 
distribution. In place of the linear functions, exponential functions can be used such as y = aX-b for 
x ~ In b / In a and y = 0 for 0 ~ x ~ In b / In a (where a > 1 and b > 0) for the individual income tax 
schedule and y = a + ~ (where a > 1,~ > 0) for the sales tax schedule. A log-normal distribution 
function can be used to depict the distribution of income. 
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Denoting the amount of an increase (or a reduction) in the tax revenue via the 
individual income tax as ~TI' we have: 
~TI = f5(ax - b)f(x)dx. (4) 
Similarly, denoting the amount of an increase (or a reduction) in the tax revenue via 
the sales tax as ~ T s, we have: 
~TS = f5(ax + ~)f(x)dx. (5) 
Thus, the assumption above can be succinctly expressed as: 
(6) 
(vi) A choice of taxes is determined through referendum. Every income earner is a voter 
and every voter is an income earner. Each voter casts a ballot in favor of the 
individual income tax (the sales tax) if her or his income tax payment (sales tax 
payment) is less than her or his sales tax payment (income tax payment); the voter 
participation rate is 100% (or, alternatively put, is uniform across the distribution of 
income). It is tacitly assumed that the public project to be financed has a uniform 
impact on individuals' utility functions across the entire electorate. 
Having set forth the assumptions of the model, how can we explain and predict the 
outcome of a referendum, when the voters are asked to choose between the individual 
income tax and the sales tax in order to fund a certain public project? We will work this 
question in two parts for the sake of greater tractability, deducing two propositions, 
Proposition I and Proposition 2. The first part simplifies the individual income tax 
schedule to be a proportional function; that is, we suppress the value of parameter b to be 
zero for the time being, while in the second part we will allow parameter b to be positive, 
to consider a non-proportional linear individual income tax schedule. 
Proposition 1 (The Case of a Proportional Income Tax Schedule): 
Given the preceding set of assumptions except that parameter b in the individual income 
tax schedule is suppressed to zero, the community will choose through referendum to raise 
additional tax revenue by the individual income tax instead of by the sales tax to fund a 
given public project. Succinctly put, 
- * x<x (7) 
where x is the median income and x* is the level of income of the individuals whose 
income tax payment is equal to their sales tax payment (i.e., the intersection between the 
two tax schedules). 
Proof 
Solving the two linear tax schedules, we obtain: 
x* = p/(a - a). (8) 
To compute the median of the relative frequency distribution function of incomes, x, 
solve the following for X, 
fX{~(1 + M ) _ 2x }dX = 1 I 2. 
x x x - M x(x - M) (9) 
Completing the integration in equation (9) results in 
(X-X)2 / [X(x-M)]=1/2 (10) 
from which we have 
x = x -.)x(x - M)/2. (11) 
Note that x* is defined in terms of the parameters of the tax schedules whereas x is defined 
in terms of the parameters of the income distribution function. As they stand, equations (8) 
and (11) cannot be compared for the absence of common terms between them. 
The assumption (v) is instrumental in expressing and in common terms. Remembering 
that, in setting out Proposition 1, the value of parameter b is suppressed to be zero, we spell 
out the assumption (vi), ~TI = ~Ts as follows 
1M [ 2x } fX [2 ( M) 2X} (ax) =- x + (ax) = 1 + _ - _ _ x o xM M x x-M x(x-M) 
1M [ 2x } fX [2 ( M) 2X} = (ax+p) =- x+ (ax+p) = 1+ _ - _ _ x o xM M x x-M x(x-M) 
(12) 
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The relation expressed in (12) is true by construction and leads to: 
(x + M) / 3 = ~ / (a - ex), (13) 
which, in light of equation (8), enables x* to be expressed in the parameters of the relative 
frequency distribution function of income: 
Computing 
* x =(x+M)/3. 
x* -x=(x+M)/3-(x-~x(x-M)/2) 
=(x-2M)(x+M»0 
(·.·M < x / 2 by construction, given in assumption (i)). Hence, x < x*. QED 
Proposition 2 (The Case of a Non-proportional Linear Income Tax Schedule): 
(14) 
(15) 
Given the assumptions of the model in full force (i.e., parameter b > 0), the outcome of 
the referendum will be to choose the individual income tax instead of the sales tax to raise 
additional tax revenue to fund a given public project. Succinctly put, 
- ** x<x (16) 
where x** is the level of income of the individuals whose income tax payment is equal to 
their sales tax payment given b > O. 
Proof 
Solving the two linear tax schedules, we obtain: 
x** =(b+~)/(a-ex). (17) 
The assumption ilTI= ilTs implies 
!{(X+M)a+ _ b
3 
2 -3b}=!{(X+M)a+3~}. 3 xMa 3 (18) 
By rearranging equation (18), we have 
x** =~= x+M +..!.(~)(_l ). 
a - ex 3 3 xMa 2 a - ex 
(19) 
Recall x*= (x+M)/3. Noting that the last term on the right-hand side is positive, we can 
conclude that x < x* < x**. QED 
Therefore, more people will vote in favor of the individual income tax approach instead 
of the sales tax approach to fund a given public project. 
3. Conclusions 
We examine the content of public choice in a special context. When people are given a 
choice between an individual income tax and a sales tax to fund a given public project 
through referendum, its outcome will be the choice of the individual income tax. We take 
into account both the force of the two tax schedules and that of the distribution of income. 
The parameters of the two tax schedules and the distribution of income are placed within 
the values that are considered to portray our observation. 
Though we use the linear functions for the three relations, they are merely to serve the 
purpose of simple computation and they in no way lose the analytic essence or the elements 
of our observation. 
A few comments are in order: 
(1) A similar binary choice problem may be presented between a property tax and a sales 
tax because a property tax schedule most likely emulates an income tax schedule. 
(2) Does the model presented here give a full account of repeated failures for the state 
government of Oregon to introduce a sales tax? 
(3) How does the model fail to explain the absence of an income tax in some states such 
as Washington, Texas and Florida? 
Perhaps, assumption (vii) may be overly strong: the variation in the voter participation 
rate may account for the absence of an income tax in those three states. However, it is a 
simple task to incorporate the varying voter participation rate into our analysis. Once the 
varying voter participation rate is incorporated into our analysis, propositions 1 and 2 will 
have to be restated in terms of not only the parameters of those tax schedules and the 
income distribution function but also the parameters that define the voter participation rate. 
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